SPECIAL ARTICLE

Limits of integration

Implications Of Ireland's Rejection Of The Lisbon Treaty

By Sushila Ramaswamy

In the theories of federalism and integration there are crucial differences over the proper balance between the centripetal and centrifugal forces. The ideal type of federalism is said to be dual federalism with equal status for both the Centre and the state units. This was practised in the US from the inception of the constitution till the era of the New Deal.
There is no such "ideal type" in the integration theory though there has been an interesting debate between the "deepeners" and the "broadeners" in the context of European integration. The "deepeners" want more powers for the centralising authority and curtailment of the residuary powers of the integrating units both in terms of fiscal policies and such issues as a comprehensive and coordinated foreign policy. On the other hand, the "broadeners" have a minimalist attitude and propose a functionalist union limiting the function of the centralising authority and leaving most of the powers to the sovereign states which comprise the larger integrated whole.

The Euro zone

In this assumption, integration assumes a purely functionalist arrangement which is mutually arrived at in the context of the economic situation modelled after the economics of scale and comparative advantage of each unit. For instance, in the present financial crisis, Brussels cannot penalise Britain though its inflation is likely to surpass 3 per cent beyond the limit imposed in the Euro-zone countries.
This debate will be heard more frequently and with greater intensity after the rejection of the Lisbon treaty, also known as the European Union Reform Treaty, by Ireland in last week's referendum which followed the rejection of the European constitution in both France and Holland in 2005. In the UK, both the opposition Conservative and 25 Labour backbenchers had demanded a referendum, which was defeated by 311 to 148 votes in the House of Commons on 5 March 2008. Gordon Brown's refusal to support a referendum reversed the government's 2005 manifesto pledge to hold a plebiscite on the European constitution. In the Czech Republic, the ratification is delayed as the top court is to decide whether the treaty complies with the constitution. Hungary was the first to ratify the treaty.
It is interesting to note that all the three important political parties in Ireland supported the treaty and the top decision-makers in Brussels expected a cakewalk in a situation when already 18 out of the 27 nations comprising the European Union have already endorsed the treaty. However, a tiny state like Ireland, which has greatly benefited from the EU largesse in economic matters and consisting of less than one per cent of the population of the EU, has halted successfully this march towards a more integrated European Union.
The question that the integration theorists and practitioners will have to address is the issue that has become the focal point in Ireland after the rejection of the EU constitution, namely the limit to integration involving well established nation states with a long historical lineage.
The vote against the treaty is not against the idea of a united Europe, which from the days of de Gaulle has become popular. Indeed, the dream of a unified Europe till the Urals has been made possible after the collapse of communism, with integration and expansion of the central and eastern European nations within the EU. The contentious issue is the nature and content of an integration involving sovereign nations.
The Lisbon Treaty was signed in the Portuguese capital by the leaders of the 27 European member-states in December 2007, and governments were expected to ratify it by 2008 for it to come into effect in January 2009. Drafted in 2004, the treaty consists of 448 articles, and conceives of a first supranational super-state, a huge step towards the evolution of what is referred to as the European project. There already exists a unified European foreign and security policy as well as supranational legal structure. In 1999, the Euro, the single European currency was introduced with a European central bank. The Lisbon Treaty paves the way for the creation of a European foreign minister at the head of the European Foreign Service (with its own diplomatic corps) and a European president of the European council chosen for two years, replacing the current practice where countries take turns at being president for six months, both these positions having the trappings of a fledgling super-state.
Daniel Hannan, a European parliament member points out that the treaty with provisions for a pan-European magistracy (Eurojust), a European Public Prosecutor and a federal EU police force (Europol), an European criminal code and removal of national vetoes in a number of areas will erode the legal sovereignty of European nation states. In addition, in about 40 policy areas, Britain would have to sacrifice its veto right over European decision-making.
The European constitution and its successor treaty centralise political power in the hands of the ruling elite in Brussels based on the idea that sovereignty of the nation state should be pooled together for the "greater good" of Europe. Furthermore, the people of Europe should not have a vote on the treaty thus making the European project undemocratic and opaque.
Margaret Thatcher in her seminal book Statecraft rightly wrote: "That such an unnecessary and irrational project as building a European superstate was ever embarked upon will seem in future years to be perhaps the greatest folly of the modern era".
The suspicion of the many of the small units within the EU which has become the key issue in the Irish referendum relates to the question of identity and culture and the capacity to formulate one's own economic policy protecting innovations and creativity, and also to ensure that the voices of the smaller nations are heard with respect by the larger units of the EU without compromising on their self-respect and dignity as an equal unit.

Power-sharing

All these issues are eminently worthy of consideration for a successful federation. The integrationists will have to find a satisfactory answer to all of them if they want a united Europe to be a successful reality.
The key to this success lies in practising democracy and evolving a mechanism of power-sharing in which all the divergent views are accommodated within the national decision making-process. In Belgium and Switzerland, the problems relating to heterogeneity and minorities were resolved by grand coalitions and power-sharing with veto available to the smaller communities in the decision-making process.
The EU is facing a similar crisis of identity and suspicion in which both the more well-off nations like France and Holland do not want a closer union mainly because of their fear that they would lose their privileged status and a high standard of living which many of the new entrants to the EU can only aspire in the future.
The second category is the problem of identity and the issues of language, culture and religion. Abortion, a matter of secondary consideration to the decision-makers in Brussels, is an important issue in Ireland.
It is this intricate balancing and the capacity of the decision-makers to balance both the best-off and the worst-off within the EU and, also to reassure the smaller players of their assured position that will determine the future course of European integration. It will depend on the capacity to decentralise and create confidence in the local units of their meaningful existence in a larger body.

The writer is Reader in Political Science, Jesus and Mary College, New Delhi